The Difficulty of a Plaintiff\u27s Playground Being Truly  Open for Buisiness : An Overview of West Virginia\u27s Corporate Law Governing Derivative Lawsuits by Flangan, Heather
Volume 110 Issue 2 Article 12 
January 2008 
The Difficulty of a Plaintiff's Playground Being Truly "Open for 
Buisiness": An Overview of West Virginia's Corporate Law 
Governing Derivative Lawsuits 
Heather Flangan 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Heather Flangan, The Difficulty of a Plaintiff's Playground Being Truly "Open for Buisiness": An Overview of 
West Virginia's Corporate Law Governing Derivative Lawsuits, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. (2008). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/12 
This Student Work is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
THE DIFFICULTY OF A PLAINTIFF'S PLAYGROUND
BEING TRULY "OPEN FOR BUSINESS": AN
OVERVIEW OF WEST VIRGINIA'S CORPORATE
LAW GOVERNING DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 884
II. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF DERIVATIVE ACTIONS ................................. 886
A. Derivative versus direct actions ............................................. 887
B. State law governs the process and requirements for bringing a
derivative action ..................................................................... 887
1. Standing requirem ents ............................................... 888
2. Demand to the corporate board ................................. 889
C. Purpose of the regulation of derivative actions ...................... 890
III. DELAWARE LAW GOVERNING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS ........................ 890
A. Section 32 7 of Delaware General Corporation Law .............. 891
B. Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 ................................. 893
C. D elaware common law ........................................................... 895
IV. WEST VIRGINIA LAW GOVERNING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS ................. 896
A. Derivative law in West Virginia under West Virginia Code
Section 31-1-103 ..................................................................... 897
B. West Virginia Acts 2002 Second Extraordinary Session repeals
Section 31-1-103, leaving derivative actions in West Virginia to
be governed by little substantive law ...................................... 900
C. Applicability of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.902
V. ARGUMENT REGARDING THE ENACTMENT OF RMBCA SUBCHAPTER D
SECTIONS 7.40 THROUGH 7.47 IN WEST VIRGINIA .............................. 903
A. The evolution of the Model Business Corporations Act with
respect to derivative actions ................................................... 904
B . Subchap ter D .......................................................................... 904
C. Subchapter D provides the most extensive regulation of
derivative suits ........................................................................ 907
D. Arguments for the enactment of Subchapter D ....................... 909
E. The Enactment of Subchapter D and portions of former West
Virginia Code Section 31-1-103 to aide West Virginia's
campaign to "Open for Business .............................
IV . C ON CLU SION ....................................................................................... 912
1
Flangan: The Difficulty of a Plaintiff's Playground Being Truly "Open for
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Governor Joe Manchin is determined to battle West Virginia's
economic deficit by improving the business climate in West Virginia.' In his
2005 State of the State Address, he announced that West Virginia would
become "Open for Business.",2 Less than a year after taking office, Governor
Manchin reported significant progress in the State's economic development
efforts to create and preserve jobs as well as to procure the investment of more
that $115 million dollars in West Virginia.3
Since that report, Governor Manchin has continued to emphasize that
the health and well-being of West Virginia citizens is contingent on economic
improvement.4 In an effort to make financial recovery and address long-term
pension debts, the Governor, executive officers, and the West Virginia State
Legislature have decreased the State sales tax on groceries5 and have worked
with insurance 6 reform. In addition, they have engaged in tax modernization to
eliminate unnecessary nuisances to businesses and are working to provide nec-
essary cuts in corporate taxes.7
Because of these changes, 18,000 jobs have been created, and
approximately $3.5 billion have been invested in new business endeavors in the
I Joe Manchin, Governor, W. Va., W. Va. State of the State Address (Feb. 9, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/speech?contentld=1 6616).
2 Id.
3 Press Release, Governor Introduces West Virginia "Open for Business" Reports (Nov. 1,
2005), http://www.wvgov.org/04B/OFB 1l05.pdf. In this report, Governor Manchin also empha-
sized several areas in which the state would concentrate to facilitate more economic growth, in-
cluding the use of innovative technology to harness the state's resources. Id. In addition, he
announced, among other job-creating developments in West Virginia, the construction of a $100
million wallboard plant in Charleston, W. Va., and the relocation of International Coal Group's
corporate headquarters to Wheeling, W. Va. Id.
4 Joe Manchin, Governor, W. Va., W. Va. State of the State Address (Jan. 11, 2006) (tran-
script available at http:/ /www.stateline.org/live/details/speech?contentID=83078).
5 W. VA. CODE § 1 -I5-3a (2005).
6 W. VA. CODE § 33-15-4a (2005).
7 In the November 9, 2006 special session, lawmakers lowered the business franchise tax
from 0.70 percent to 0.55 percent. W. VA. CODE § 11-23-6 (2006). Also, in 2007, the West Vir-
ginia State Legislature considered Senate Bill 750, which proposed to decrease West Virginia's
8.75 percent corporate net income tax rate to 6.5 percent. S. B. 750, 2007 78th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 2007), available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us. Though Senate Bill 750 passed in
the Senate, it died in a House Finance Committee on March 1, 2007. Id. If reconsidered, this
change would make West Virginia more competitive with other states such as Virginia, where the
corporate income tax rate is six percent. See George Hohmann, Business Leaders Enthused About
Tax Cut Bills, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 28, 2007, at PlA.
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state.8 Nevertheless, as Governor Manchin stated in his 2007 State of the State
address, this progress is still "clearly not enough." 9  In an era where states
engage in intense competition to attract businesses, West Virginia must continue
to improve its corporate appeal. One important element of this appeal involves
the state business corporations' law.
A recent study published in the Journal of Law and Economics found
that when choosing a state in which to incorporate, businesses favored states
that provided them with legal security to maintain control of their companies. 10
Therefore, it is no surprise that the cardinal precept of the General Corporation
Law of the State of Delaware, the lead corporate state, is that "directors [of a
corporation], rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the
corporation."'1
However, frivolous derivative actions 2 often prevent directors from ef-
fectively managing their businesses.' 3 Delaware courts have found that "[b]y its
very nature the derivative action impinges on the managerial freedom of direc-
tors.' 4 Thus, to allow corporate managers to control their businesses with rea-
sonable freedom, Delaware provides a plethora of law governing derivative ac-
tions, which is arguably one reason businesses choose to incorporate in Dela-
ware.
15
Conversely, West Virginia offers very little substantive law governing
derivative actions, leaving it extremely plaintiff friendly and hostile to corporate
boards and directors.' 6 This situation exists because, in 2002, the West Virginia
Legislature left a gaping hole in the corporate code concerning derivative law-
suits when it repealed W. Va. Code Sections 31-1-98 to 31-1-158 through the
"Business Corporation Act." This Note contends that filling this pothole with a
combination of former West Virginia legislation and innovative protections
drafted by the Revised Model Business Corporations Act ("RMBCA") will re-
8 Joe Manchin, Governor, W. Va., 2007 State of the State Address (Jan. 10, 2007) (transcript
available at http://www.wvgov.org/sec.aspx?Id=101).
9 Id.
10 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L.
& EcON. 383, 421 (2003) (concluding that amassing anti-takeover statutes makes states more
successful in the incorporation market both in retaining in-state firms and in attracting out-of-state
incorporations).
11 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
12 A derivative action is "[a] suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce a right belonging to
the fiduciary; esp., a suit asserted by a shareholder on the corporation's behalf against a third party
(usu. a corporate officer) because of the corporation's failure to take some action against the third
party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (abridged 8th ed. 2005).
13 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.
14 Id.
15 See infra Section III.
16 See infra Section IV.
20081
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suit in a significant step toward enticing more businesses to incorporate in West
Virginia.
17
Part 11 of this Note will provide an overview of derivative actions in the
United States with particular emphasis on typical standing requirements to bring
a derivate action, and the general requirement of demanding a corporation to
pursue an action before a derivative suit may be initiated by shareholders. Part
II of this Note will provide a more detailed analysis of these areas and others as
they are governed by statutory and common law in Delaware, where more than
308,000 companies are incorporated, and, as a result, the unemployment rate is
significantly lower than the national average.
Part IV of this Note will contrast Delaware law by explaining the his-
torical evolution of law governing derivative lawsuits in West Virginia. More
precisely, Part IV of this Note describes how West Virginia law ran off track
after the legislature repealed W. Va. Code section 31-1-103 and left the State
with little substantive law to govern derivative actions. Finally, Part V of this
Note provides three possible solutions for filling the gap in West Virginia law
governing derivative lawsuits. It then identifies this Author's preferred solution
and proposal that the West Virginia Legislature adopt Subchapter D of the
RMBCA as well as a portion of former W. Va. Code Section 31-1-103 in order
to make West Virginia competitive with corporate-friendly states such as Dela-
ware.
II. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
A sound understanding of derivative actions is imperative to the discus-
sion at hand, and thus is addressed briefly in this portion of the Note. A deriva-
tive action is a suit initiated by a shareholder of a corporation, on the corpora-
tion's behalf, against a wrong-doing third-party when the corporation fails to
take action. 18 Typically, the wrong-doing third-party is a corporate director or
officer who has caused harm to the corporation by engaging in misfeasance or
malfeasance. 19 Because the harm is caused to the entire corporation and there-
fore its "whole body of shareholders," the derivative suit seeks recovery for the
benefit of the corporation and all of its shareholders in common. 20 Before bring-
17 See 2002 W. Va. Acts 2584-765.
18 See supra note 12.
19 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (stating that "the purpose of the
derivative action [is] to place in the hands of the individual shareholder a means to protect the
interest of the corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance of 'faithless directors and man-
agers').
20 Seth Aronson, et al. Recent Developments in Shareholder Derivative Actions, in SECURITES
LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INsTrrtE 2005, at 111, 115 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 6746, 2005) (citing Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal.
1969) ("A shareholder's derivative suit seeks to recover for the benefit of the corporation and its
whole body of shareholders when injury is caused to the corporation that may not otherwise be
redressed because of failure of the corporation to act. Thus, 'the action is derivative, i.e., in the
[Vol. 110
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ing a derivative action, a plaintiff must consider if he has the ability and/or de-
sire to bring a direct suit,2' and he must abide by the law governing derivative
actions in the state in which the corporation is incorporated.
22
A. Derivative versus direct actions
In determining if he or she will bring a derivative action, a shareholder
may find that the line between a direct and a derivative action is sometimes dif-
ficult to distinguish.23 Unlike a derivative action, which is instituted on behalf
of the corporations and its shareholders, a direct action occurs when a share-
holder is personally aggrieved and is trying to recover damages from the board
of directors. 24 In most states, two, often overlapping, exceptions allow a share-
holder to bring a direct action against a corporation: "(1) where there is a special
duty, such as a contractual duty, between the wrongdoer and the shareholder,
and (2) where the shareholder suffered an injury separate and distinct from that
suffered by other shareholders. 25
B. State law governs the process and requirements for bringing a
derivative action
Shareholders who choose to bring derivative actions for reasons such as
those mentioned above must determine the requirements for bringing a deriva-
tive action as mandated by state law in the state of incorporation. State law gov-
erns whether an action is direct or derivative.26 In addition, the law of the state
of incorporation governs the standing requirements for bringing a shareholder
derivative action.27
corporate right, if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body
of its stock or property without any severance or distribution among individual holders, or if it
seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its assets."')).
21 See generally Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971).
22 State v. Wilson, 434 S.E.2d 411,418 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that "the local law of the state
of incorporation should be applied to determine who can bring a shareholder derivative suit").
23 Abelow v. Symonds, 156 A.2d 416, 420 (Del. Ch. 1959) (stating that "[tlhe line of distinc-
tion between derivative suits and those brought for the enforcement of personal rights asserted on
behalf of a class of stockholders is often a narrow one, the latter type of actions being designed to
enforce common rights running against plaintiffs' own corporation or those dominating it, while
the former are clearly for the purpose of remedying wrongs to the corporations itself").
24 BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 385 (abridged 8th edition 2005).
25 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5911 (perm. Ed., rev. vol. 2000).
26 Aronson, supra note 20, at 122 (citing Sax v. World Wide Press, Inc., 809 F.2d 610, 613
(9th Cir. 1987)).
27 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that "[e]xcept in matters gov-
erned by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the state"); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1991) (holding that in a
derivative action, the need for uniformity in corporate governance requires that a shareholder's
2008]
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1. Standing requirements
In most states, a plaintiff has standing to bring a derivative action if it
appears he or she is a shareholder who "fairly and adequately represents the
interest of the stockholders similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corpo-
ration. 28 To determine if a shareholder provides a fair and adequate representa-
tion, courts have considered different factors such as whether the plaintiff is a
true party in interest, if the plaintiff is familiar with the litigation, the degree of
control exercised by the attorney over the litigation, the degree of support
offered by the other shareholders, the lack of plaintiffs personal commitment to
the action, and the remedy sought.29
Courts differ in opinion about when a plaintiff is a true party in interest.
Most states require a plaintiff to be a shareholder of the corporation at the time
the derivative action is filed and at the time of the challenged transaction.3 °
Requiring a plaintiff to have "contemporaneous ownership" is intended to
prevent prospective plaintiffs from purchasing shares after they learn of an
alleged wrong-doing to the corporation in order to bring a derivative lawsuit.3 '
Thus, this requirement protects corporations and their shareholders from
potential "gold diggers."
Some states also protect corporations by requiring a plaintiff to post
bond for litigation expenses if the derivative suit fails in order to prevent frivo-
lous suits; 32 however, several of these states only require bond to be posted by
plaintiffs when their interest in the corporation is relatively small.33 Though it
standing be determined by the law of the corporation's state of incorporation); Gallop v. Caldwell,
120 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1941) (holding that a shareholder's ability to bring a derivative action is a
substantive issue, which must be determined by the law of the corporation's state of incorpora-
tion). In comments to Section 302 of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Restatement
explains the rationale for the application of the local law of the state of incorporation is that "[it]
will usually be supported by those choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the interstate and
international systems, certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, protection of the justified
expectations of the parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFCONFLICTOF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (1971).
28 18 C.J.S. § 405 (May 2006) (citing Rothenberg v. Sec. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 958, 961
(8th Cir. 1982); Halsted Video, Inc. v. Guttillo, 115 F.R.D. 177, 179 (N.D. I11 987); Neusteter v.
District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 675 P.2d 1, 7 (Colo. 1984); Camp v. Chase,
476 A.2d 1087, 1088 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983); Dawson v. Dawson, 645 S.W.2d 120, 126 (Mo. Ct.
App. W.D. 1982).
29 Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 961; Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 169, 176 (N.D. II1. 1983);
Roussel v. Tidelands Capital Corp., 438 F.Supp. 684, 688 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (citing FED. R. CIv. P.
23.1).
30 Aronson, supra note 20, at 123.
31 Id.
32 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949).
33 Aronson, supra note 20, at 124.
[Vol. 110
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once did, West Virginia substantive law currently does not require shareholders
with little interest in the corporation to post bond.3 4
2. Demand to the corporate board
Once the court dictates that a plaintiff has adequate standing to bring a
derivative lawsuit, state law determines if the plaintiff must first make a demand
on the corporation.35 In most situations, a shareholder will be required to make
a demand on the board because the corporation's directors and officers pre-
sumptively should determine if an action should be pursued on behalf of the
company.36 In fact, some states require a "universal demand," which mandates
that before any derivative action is brought, a demand must be made to the
board of directors.37
If demand is made and rejected by the board, the board's decision is
protected by the business judgment rule; therefore, a plaintiff making the
demand may not subsequently assert that the demand is excused.38 Thus, after
demand is made and refused, a plaintiff may only assert that the demand was
wrongfully refused.39  To prove that demand was wrongfully refused, the
plaintiff must meet a very high bar by pleading with particularity that the
40directors did not act independently or with due care.
When demand is excused, many states still allow a board of directors to
move to dismiss a derivative suit by creating an independent committee to
investigate the feasibility and desirability of the suit for the corporation. 41
Courts have adopted different approaches concerning the review of the special
34 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
35 "To satisfy the demand requirement, a complaint must 'allege with particularity the efforts,
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires ... and the reasons for the
plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort."' Aronson supra note 20, at
130 (citing DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1).
36 Id. at 129.
37 To eliminate the difficulty of making case-specific determinations, the Business Law Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association proposed the universal demand requirement which requires
demand in all cases, without exception, and, unless the corporation would suffer irreparable in-
jury, requires the plaintiffs to wait 90 days after making the demand, unless the demand is rejected
earlier, before initiating the derivative suit. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 251 (Robert C. Clark et
al., eds., 6th ed. 2006). At least eleven states, including Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin
require universal demand. Id.
38 Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1005 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that the determination of
the special litigation committee foreclosed further judicial inquiry in this case because under the
business judgment rule, the substantive decision was out of the reach of the court).
39 Id. at 1003.
40 Id.
41 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
2008]
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committee's independence, good faith, and its bases for supporting its conclu-
sions.42 Some courts exercise their own independent business judgment in de-
termining whether a motion to dismiss an action should be granted after they
find that a committee has acted independently and in good faith.43 Others re-
view only the procedures used by the special committee and hold that conclu-
sions reached by the committee are "outside the scope" of the court's review.44
West Virginia currently provides no substantive law requiring that demand be
made on a corporation before a plaintiff may bring a derivative action.45
C. Purpose of the regulation of derivative actions
State legislatures regulate derivative actions, in part, in an effort to pro-
tect businesses from frivolous lawsuits and, thus, to entice them to incorporate
in their states. Frivolous lawsuits generate discovery costs and are often even
settled simply to avoid further litigation costs.46 According to Wyatt Co., a
Washington consulting firm, the average cost of a shareholder suit in 1994 was
$7.7 million for a settlement.47 It is clear that with unnecessary legal expenses
this high, corporations consider the business law in a state when choosing where
to incorporate.48 Similarly, it is also not a stretch to understand that states hope
to entice businesses. 49 Therefore, state legislatures regulate derivative actions to
attract businesses and promote the economy.
lI. DELAWARE LAW GOVERNING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
Section Id of this Note provided an overview of corporation law
governing derivative actions in the United States; however, the overview is far
from inclusive of all state law because corporate law is extremely state-specific.
Thus, for a more detailed description of statutory and common law governing
42 Aronson, supra note 20, at 159-60.
43 Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89. See also In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917,
947-48 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that the corporate committee's motion to dismiss should not be
granted where demand had been excused because the committee's independence was not estab-
lished).
44 Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 994.
45 See infra Section IV.
46 Corporate Settlement Costs Hit Record, WALL ST. J., March 10, 1995, at B3. See also
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007) (explaining that private
security fraud actions must be regulated because "if not adequately contained, can be employed
abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and individuals whose conduct conforms to
the law) (citation omitted).
47 Corporate Settlement Costs Hit Record, supra note 46.
48 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49 In its legislative history, one Delaware legislator commented that, "[i]f we maintain our
business-friendly environment, more [businesses] will come and they will grow here." DEL.
HOUSE JOURNAL, H.R. 104-6, Reg. Sess. (Del. 2000).
[Vol. 110
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derivative actions, this Section examines law in Delaware, a leading corporate
law state where the legislature endeavors to maintain a corporate friendly at-
mosphere.5°
Delaware is nicknamed "corporate capital" because more than 308,000
companies are incorporated in Delaware, including 60% of the Fortune 500
companies and 50% of the companies listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change.5' Companies incorporate in Delaware because it offers advanced and
flexible corporate law.52 Delaware's law governing derivative actions is no ex-
ception because Delaware recognizes that laws governing derivative actions are
necessary to limit the "potentially disruptive effects of derivative litigation on
the ability of a board of directors to direct the business and affairs of a corpora-
tion. 53 Therefore, Delaware intentionally attempts to create a balance between
"the Delaware prerogative that directors manage the affairs of a corporation
with the realization that shareholder policing, via derivative actions, is a neces-
sary check on the behavior of directors .. ,4
To achieve this balance and to promote business, Delaware does not
prevent shareholder actions entirely, but regulates derivative law suits through
statutory law, Rules of the Court of Chancery, and an abundance of case law.55
These combined sources address, among other things, standing requirements,
demand requirements and demand futility, attorney-client privilege, representa-
tion of the defendants, settlements of derivative actions, and award of attorney's
fees in derivative actions.56
A. Section 327 of Delaware General Corporation Law
Section 327 of Delaware General Corporation Law provides the basic
standing requirement in Delaware by mandating that a stockholder must be a
stockholder at the time of the alleged wrongdoing before he or she will have
standing to bring a shareholder derivative action unless his shares devolved
50 In its legislative history, the Delaware legislature recognizes that its economy is evolving to
"[offer] good jobs with excellent wages and benefits" and that they must "maintain our business-
friendly environment" to continue the growth. Id.
51 Introduction to Delaware (2002), www.netstate.com/states/intro/de-intro.htm.
52 Delaware Division of Corporations, Frequently Asked Questions (2007),
http://www.state.de.us/corp/faqs.shtml#numcorps/. Businesses choose Delaware because it pro-
vides "a complete package of incorporations services." Id.
53 Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. Ch. 2004).
54 Id.
55 See generally DEL. CODE 8 § 327 (2007); 56 Del. Laws, ch. 50 (1967); 71 Del. Laws, ch.
339, § 73 (1998). See also DAvID A. DREXLER Er AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND
PRACTICE ch. 42 (David Colby et al., eds., 2006).
56 See generally EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW, GCL-XHI-1-155 (5th ed, Supp. 2007). While Welch discusses other protections provided in
Delaware, those discussed in most detail are examined in this Note.
2008]
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upon him by operation of law.57 Section 327 was promulgated to prevent a
plaintiff from purchasing shares to attack an alleged wrong-doing or transaction
that occurred prior to his purchase. 8
Delaware courts interpret Section 327 to require that the plaintiff remain
a shareholder throughout the litigation,59 unless the wrong complained of is an
ongoing wrong.6° Similarly, a stockholder may not attack transactions which
were "executed" or "consummated" prior to the date he acquired his stock.
61
Delaware courts have also interpreted Section 327 to define the meaning
of a shareholder and the adequacy of his representation. Though equitable
owners62 and beneficial owners have standing to bring a derivative suit,
63
holders of convertible debentures, warrants to buy stock, and creditors do not.
64
In addition, while interpreting Section 327, the Delaware courts have provided
the following factors to determine whether a given plaintiff will be an adequate
representative in a derivative action:
[E]conomic antagonisms between representative and class; the
remedy sought by plaintiff in the derivative action; indications
that the named plaintiff was not the driving force behind the
litigation; plaintiff's unfamiliarity with the litigation; other liti-
gation pending between the plaintiff and defendants; the relative
magnitude of plaintiff's personal interests as compared to his
interest in the derivative action itself; plaintiff's vindictiveness
toward the defendants and, finally, the degree of support plain-
57 DEL. CODE 8 § 327 ("In any derivative suit instituted by a stockholder of a corporation, it
shall be averred in the complaint that the plaintiff was a stockholder of the corporation at the time
of the transaction of which such stockholder complains or that such stockholder's stock thereafter
devolved upon such stockholder by operation of law.").
58 DREXLER ET AL., supra note 55, at § 42.03(1).
59 Id. (citing Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1992).
60 Newkirk v. W.J. Rainey, Inc., 76 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. Ch. 1950).
61 Id.
62 Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 218 (Del. Ch. 1974), affid in part, rev'd in part, 347 A.2d
133 (Del. 1975); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. Ch. 1948); Brown v.
Dolese, 154 A.2d 233, 239 (Del. Ch. 1960). See also Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v. Saks, 122 A.2d
120, 121 (Del. 1956) (holding that a stockholder who owns stock in a margin account is consid-
ered an equitable owner).
63 Jones v. Taylor, 348 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1975). A beneficial owner is a person under a
contract who is entitled to receive stock in the future. Id. at 191.
64 In re New Valley Corp. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 17649-NC, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. June
28, 2004) (holders of warrants do not have standing in a derivative action); Harff, 324 A.2d at 219
(holders of convertible debentures do not have standing in a derivative action).
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tiff was receiving from the shareholders he purported to repre-
sent.65
Delaware courts have held that any of these factors could warrant
disqualification of a plaintiff in a derivative action if defendants show that the
factor(s) could prevent the plaintiff from representing the shareholders as a
whole.
66
B. Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1
Though Section 327 is the only statutory provision addressing
derivative actions, the Court of Chancery provides rules as well.6 7 The
Delaware Court of Chancery set forth two requirements in Chancery Rule
23.1.68 First it provides a demand requirement, which requires that a plaintiff in
a derivative suit "aver the effort made to obtain action from the board of
'directors or comparable authority' or otherwise set forth the reasons for not
making the effort., 69 Next, Rule 23.1 requires that dismissal or compromise of
a derivative suit must be approved by the court, and if the dismissal is with
prejudice, adequate notice must be given to other stockholders unless the suit
65 Youngman v. Tahmoush, 457 A.2d 376, 379-80 (Del. Ch. 1983). See also Wiegand v.
Berry Petroleum Co., C.A. No. 9316, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 1989); Scopas Tech. Co. v.
Lord, C.A. No. 7559, slip op. at 2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 1984); Katz v. Plant Indus., Inc., C.A. No.
6407, slip op. at 2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1981).
66 Youngman, 457 A.2d at 381; Scopas, C.A. No. 7559, slip op. at 2.
67 WELCH ET AL., supra note 56, at GCL-XIII-42.
68 The Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 provides:
(a) In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corpora-
tion or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be as-
serted by it, the complaint shall allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or
member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share
or membership thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law. The com-
plaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plain-
tiff to obtain the action he desires for the directors or comparable authority
and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.
... (c) The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the Court, and notice by mail, publication or otherwise of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such
manner as the Court directs; except that if the dismissal is to be without preju-
dice or with prejudice to the plaintiff only, then such dismissal shall be or-
dered without notice thereof if there is a showing that no compensation in any
form has passed directly or indirectly from any of the defendants to the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs attorney and that no promise to give any such compensation
has been made.
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was only directed to the specific plaintiff.70 Rule 23.1 requires that before a
derivative suit may be dismissed, the plaintiff must show that he or she has
received no compensation from the defendant and that no promise of compensa-
tion has been made.7' Therefore the default rule is that a stockholder has no
right to bring a derivative suit without first making a demand on the board of
directors to bring the suit itself.
72
However, a shareholder may bring a derivative action by claiming that a
demand would be a futile effort because the board of directors would not fairly
consider the corporate need for instating the action.73 To make a demand futility
claim, the shareholder must meet a high bar of proving two difficult elements.74
First, the shareholder must show that a majority of the board of directors has a
personal interest in the outcome of the claim or lacks independence to make a
decision regarding the claim. 75 Second, the shareholder must allege with par-
70 WELCH ET AL., supra note 56, at GCL-XIH-42. In determining if a settlement is reasonable
and fair, the court will consider the following factors: the validity of the claims, difficulty in
enforcing the claim, the extent to which the judgment may be recovered, cost of litigation, the
amount of the settlement award, and the perspectives of the parties involved. Polk v. Good, 507
A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986).
71 WELCH ET AL., supra note 56, at GCL-XIII-42.
72 Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988).
73 Id.
74 Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205-06 (Del. 1991) (holding that plaintiff's demand futility
complaint failed to plead particularized facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the board
had acted improperly in repurchasing a large block of stock).
75 Id. The shareholder may assert a director is interested by proving "he will be materially
affected, either to his benefit or detriment, by a decision of the board, in a manner not shared by
the corporation and the stockholders." Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del. Ch. 1995).
Naming the directors as plaintiffs, without other allegations of a board's personal interest, is not
sufficient. Scopas Tech. Co. v. Lord, C.A. No. 7559, slip op. at 4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 1984)
("Plaintiffs argument that all the directors are interested because they are not covered by the
Company's insurance in suits brought against them directly by the company is unavailing.").
Instead, a shareholder must assert that the directors face a "substantial likelihood of
liability." In re Baxter Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1270 (Del. Ch. 1995) (holding
that directors are interested for purposes of demand when "the potential for liability is not 'a mere
threat' but instead may rise to 'a substantial likelihood."' (citation omitted)). The shareholder
may also allege that "the 'sole or primary purpose' of the challenged board action was to per-
petuate the director in control of the corporation." WELCH ET AL., supra note 56, at GCL-XIH-85
(citing Green v. Phillips, C.A. No. 14436, slip op. at 9 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1996).
If the plaintiff does not allege that the directors are interested, he may allege that the
directors lack independence. A director lacks independence if he is so influenced by an interested
person that his discretion "would be sterilized" by extraneous considerations. Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984). To determine if a director's discretion is sterilized, a court will
consider not only the "power and influence of the allegedly dominating person, but ... [also] the
susceptibility of the directors to the exercise of that leverage." WELCH Er AL., supra note 56, at
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ticularized facts that the challenged transaction failed to meet the business
judgment rule.76
C. Delaware common law
In addition to Section 327, Rule 23.1, and case law interpreting them,
other common law provides stable guidelines for derivative actions in Delaware.
For example, the Delaware Supreme Court has set forth requirements of a board
in response to a demand.77 In Rales, the court stated:
The task of a board of directors in responding to a stockholder
demand letter is a two-step process. First, the directors must
determine the best method to inform themselves of the facts re-
lating to the alleged wrongdoing and the considerations, both
legal and financial, bearing on a response to the demand. If a
factual investigation is required, it must be conducted reasona-
bly and in good faith. Second, the board must weigh the alterna-
tives available to it, including the advisability of implementing
internal corrective action and commencing legal proceedings.
In carrying out these tasks, the board must be able to act free of
personal financial interest and improper extraneous influences.78
Delaware common law also provides methods for directors to terminate
action where demand has been excused.79 In Zapata, the court held that when
pre-suit demand is excused, the corporation may form special committee to dis-
miss the lawsuit. 80 In determining whether to dismiss the suit, the court will
inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases
supporting its conclusions (i.e. reasonable investigation).8 ' If the court finds
independence and good faith, it will exercise its own independent business
judgment in determining whether a motion should be granted.82
76 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 (Del. 1993) (holding that the second-prong of the
Aronson two-part test does not apply when the board considering the demand is not the board who
made the business decision). The Delaware Supreme Court has held that pre-suit demand will
only be excused "if the Court of Chancery in the first instance ... conclude[s] that the particular-
ized facts in the complaint create a reasonable doubt that the informational component of the
directors' decision making process, measured by concepts of gross negligence, included consid-
eration of all material information reasonably available." Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259
(Del. 2000) (italics in original).
77 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 (Del. 1993).
78 Id.
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Delaware courts provide direction on derivative suits in areas other than
demand as well.83
Importantly, Delaware common law also addresses the award of
attorneys' fees in a derivative action.84 For, example, in situations where the
plaintiff's derivative suit is meritorious85 and results in a benefit to the corpora-
tion, the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees from the settlement or judgment
going to the corporation.
86
While this examination of Delaware law governing derivative lawsuits
is not exhaustive, it shows that both the Delaware General Assembly and courts
have outlined extensive guidelines to govern suits by shareholders on behalf of
their corporation. By doing so, Delaware has provided protection for corpora-
tions from frivolous suits, while not depriving shareholders of a method for
checking corporate governance and recovering when appropriate.
IV. WEST VIRGINIA LAW GOVERNING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
As opposed to Delaware, West Virginia does not extensively regulate
actions brought by shareholders to prevent costly, frivolous litigation. Prior to
2002, West Virginia provided corporations some of the same protections from
83 For instance, Delaware courts adopted the "Bangor Punta" doctrine articulated by the
United States Supreme Court. Midland Food Servs., LLC v. Castle Hill Holdings V, LLC, 792
A.2d 920 (Del. Ch. 1999); Courtland Manor, Inc. v. Leeds, 347 A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1975). Under
the "Bangor Punta" doctrine, a stockholder who purchases or otherwise acquires his stock from a
party who has engaged in an alleged wrong-doing to a corporation may not bring a derivative
action in the name of the corporation. WELCH ET AL., supra note 56, at GCL-XIII-71 (citing Dar-
ley Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Smith, C.A. No. 5783, slip op. at 3-4 (Del. Ch. June 22, 1981). Also,
common law provides that statutes of limitations are applied to derivative actions regardless of
whether a claim is legal or equitable, and the statute of limitations begins when the stockholders
had reason to know about the alleged wrongdoing. Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 274
(Del. Ch. 1993).
84 Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986).
85 The standard for a "meritorious" claim is as follows:
A claim is meritorious within the meaning of the rule permitting fees for
counsel if it can withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings if, at the same
time, the plaintiff possesses knowledge of provable facts which hold out some
reasonable likelihood of ultimate success. It is not necessary that factually
there be absolute assurance of ultimate success, but only that there be some
reasonable hope.
Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966).
86 WELCH ET AL., supra note 56, at GCL-XIII-138 (citing In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., C.A.
No. 8080, slip op. at 11 (Del.Ch. July 20, 1992), aff'd, No. 375, 1992 (Del. Nov. 24, 1992) (citing
Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882))). To determine the amount of attorney's fees that should
be awarded to the plaintiff, the court considers the following factors: the benefit of the suit to the
shareholders, the time and efforts spent by the plaintiff's attorney in connection with the suit, if
the attorney's pay was based on a contingency fee, the difficulty of the litigation, and the attor-
ney's skill and experience. In re Abercrombie & Fitch Co. S'holders Derivative Litig., 886 A.2d
1271, 1273 (Del. 2005).
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frivolous derivative actions that Delaware and the Model Business Corporations
Act ("MBCA") currently do. Former West Virginia Code Section 31-1-103
addressed standing, attorney's fees, and even a security requirement for share-
holde-: with little stake in an action.87 However, in 2002, the West Virginia
Legislature repealed Section 31-1-103, leaving West Virginia with only com-
mon law to substantively govern derivative actions.
A. Derivative law in West Virginia under West Virginia Code Section 31-
1-103
Before the enactment of the "Business Corporation Act" in 2002, de-
rivative lawsuits were governed by West Virginia Code Section 31-1-103.88
That provision of the West Virginia law governing corporations required that a
plaintiff be "a holder of record of shares or of voting trust certificates thereof at
87 W. VA. CODE § 31-1-103 (2001). The former code governing derivative actions stated:
No action shall be brought in this State by a shareholder in the right of a do-
mestic or foreign corporation unless the plaintiff was a holder of record of
shares or of voting trust certificates therefor [sic] at the time of the transaction
of which he complains, or his shares or voting trust certificates thereafter de-
volved upon him by operation of law from a person who was a holder of re-
cord at such time.
In any action hereafter instituted in the right of any domestic or foreign corpo-
ration by the holder or holders of record of shares of such corporation or of
voting trust certificates therefor [sic], the court having jurisdiction, upon final
judgment and a finding that the action was brought without reasonable cause,
may require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to pay to the parties named as defendant
the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred by them in the
defense of such action.
In any action now pending or hereafter instituted or maintained in the right of
any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of record of less
than five percent of the outstanding shares of any class of such corporation or
of voting trust certificates therefor, unless the shares or voting trust certificates
so held have a market value in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars, the
corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be entitled at any time
before final judgment to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for
the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, that may be incurred by
it in connection with such action or may be incurred by other parties named as
defendant for which it may become legally liable. Market value shall be de-
termined as of the date that the plaintiff institutes the action or, in the case of
an intervenor, as of the date that he becomes a party to the action. The amount
of such security may from time to time be increased or decreased, in the dis-
cretion of the court, upon showing that the security provided has or may be-
come inadequate or is excessive. The corporation shall have recourse to such
security in such amount as the court having jurisdiction shall determine upon
the termination of such action, whether or not the court finds the action was
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the time of the transaction of which he complains.. ." before bringing a lawsuit
against a corporation. In addition, Section 31-1-103 explained that if a judge
found that an action was brought without reasonable cause, the judge could re-
quire the plaintiff(s) to pay the defendant(s) reasonable expenses, including at-
torney's fees. Furthermore, Section 31-1-103 stated that in an action where the
plaintiff held less than five percent of the outstanding shares or voting trust cer-
tificates, unless the shares or trust certificates had a value exceeding $25,000,
the corporate defendant had the right to require the plaintiffs to give "security
for the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, that may be incurred by
it in connection with such action or may be incurred by other parties named as
defendant for which it may become legally liable."' 9 In 1993, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia interpreted the then-governing Section 31-1-
103 in State ex rel. Elish v. Wilson.90 Its interpretation provided an even more
restrictive view of plaintiff standing than did Delaware law at that time.9' The
court indicated that participants in an employee stock ownership plan would not
have standing in West Virginia when they did not hold actual title of the stock
certificates. 92 The court stated that Section 31-1-103 "requires that parties be
'holders of record' in order to have standing to participate in a shareholder de-
rivative suit. '93 It then looked to Black's Law Dictionary to determine that "re-
cord owner" refers to "a person in whose name stock shares are registered on
the records of a corporation."94 Thus, the court insinuated that if a participant in
an employee stock ownership plan would not have stock shares registered in his
or her name on the records of a corporation, then he or she would not have
standing to bring a derivative action in West Virginia.95
89 Id.
90 434 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1993).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 415.
93 Id.
94 Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1274 (6th ed. 1990)).
95 Id. The court did not ultimately decide if the plaintiffs in Wilson had standing to sue or
were holders of record under West Virginia law because Weirton Steel, the corporation on whose
behalf the plaintiffs were suing, was a Delaware corporation doing business in West Virginia. Id.
Therefore, because the local law of the state of incorporation is applied to determine substantive
standing issues, the court applied Delaware common law to make the determination of standing.
Id. at 416. The court determined that "under the common law of Delaware as applicable to pro-
ceedings in equity an equitable owner of stock can maintain a stockholder's derivative
action .... ." Id. at 418 (citing Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 113 (Del.
Ch.1948)). In addition, the court quoted the Annotated Delaware Code, which states:
In any derivative suit instituted by a stockholder of a corporation, it shall be
averred in the complaint that the plaintiff was a stockholder of the corporation
at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains or that such




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/12
2008] THE DIFFICULTY OF A PLAINTIFF'S PLAYGROUND 899
Another West Virginia case, Clark v. Milam,96 addressed shareholder
standing and the statue of limitations on derivative actions when Section
31-1-103 still governed derivative actions.97 The Milam court stated that be-
cause "[i]t is well-established that shareholders bringing a derivative suit do so
on behalf of the corporation.... [i]t stands to reason [that] when shareholders
file a derivative action, their knowledge of wrongdoing should be imputed to the
corporation., 98 Therefore, the statute of limitations for the corporation runs at
the time the shareholders gain knowledge of the wrongdoing. 99
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia also addressed beneficial interest in a corporation for purposes of
standing in a derivative action under the former law.' °  In Silling v.
Erwin,0 1 plaintiff Cyrus Silling, Jr. filed a derivative action against One Morris,
a closely held company that owned and managed apartment buildings, for fail-
ing to ever declare dividends. 0 2 The plaintiff, a son of a deceased shareholder,
claimed he was a beneficial shareholder for the purposes of bringing the deriva-
tive suit against One Morris.10 3 Citing to Felsenheld v. Bloch'0 4 and Section 31-
1-103, the court agreed that "persons with a clear beneficial interest in a corpo-
ration may bring a derivative suit without being shareholders of record."'0 5
However, the court decided that the plaintiff was not a beneficial shareholder;
even though he would inherit controlling interest in One Morris if he were to
prevail in his present action, at the time of his filing the derivative action, he did
not hold an equitable interest in the stock of One Morris. °6
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 327 (1991). The court found that because the statute did not limit share-
holders with standing in a derivative action to "holders of record" as West Virginia did at the time,
and in light of the holding in Rosenthal, that under Delaware law the participants in an employee
stock ownership plan had standing to bring their derivative action. Wilson, 434 S.E.2d at 418.
96 872 F. Supp. 307, 313-14 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (holding that a shareholder derivative suit
Possibility did not preclude application of adverse possession doctrine).
Id.
98 Id. at 313.
99 Id. at 313-14.
100 Silling v. Erwin, 881 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. W. Va. 1995).
101 Id. at 238.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 239 (citing Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 192 S.E. 545 (1937)). See infra
note 131 and accompanying text.
105 Silling, 881 F. Supp. at 239.
106 Id. at 239-240.
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B. West Virginia Acts 2002 Second Extraordinary Session repeals Section
31-1-103, leaving derivative actions in West Virginia to be governed by
little substantive law
In 2000, the West Virginia Law Institute studied the West Virginia
business code and recommended it be replaced by the Revised Model Business
Corporations Act.' °7 The West Virginia Legislature largely agreed with the
Institute's suggestion and repealed West Virginia Code Sections 31-1-98 to 31-
1-158 during the Acts 2002 Second Extraordinary Session.10 8 It simultaneously
enacted the "Business Corporations Act," a near replica of the Revised Model
Business Corporations Act (RMBCA).' °9 The "near replica" left out only one
substantive section, RMBCA Section 7.40, which pertained to derivative
actions."0 Thus, the legislature repealed the former code governing derivative
actions and failed to replace it with anything.
If the West Virginia Legislature had adopted RMBCA Section 7.40, as
the West Virginia Law Institute suggested, law governing derivative actions in
West Virginia would be similar to that in Delaware. Like the law in Delaware,
Section 7.40 of the RMBCA provided standards regulating standing and
demand."'
The Legislature did not explain its decision to exclude Section 7.40 in
legislative history. However, an interview with Professor Kevin Outterson
107 W. Va. Law Institute, West Virginia Law Institute Past Projects, (2006)
http://www.wvu.edu/l-aw/wvli/pastproj.html.
108 W. Va. Code, § 31-1-103 (1988) (stating that §§ 31-1-98 to 31-1-158 were repealed by Acts
2002, 2nd Ex. Session., c. 25, effective Oct. 1, 2002). See generally, § 31D-I-101 et seq. (2002).
109 W. Va. Code § 31D-1-101 et seq. (2002).
110 See infra note 120.
II Closely Held Corp Appendix A, CHCORP APP A (2006). Section 7.40 Procedure in de-
rivative proceedings provides several protections. Section 7.40 requires that before a plaintiff
brings a derivative lawsuit, he or she must be a shareholder at the time of the alleged wrong trans-
action or he or she must become a shareholder through transfer by operation of law from a person
who was a shareholder at the time of the alleged wrong transaction. Section 7.40(e) explains that
a person who is a beneficial owner is also a shareholder for the purposes of derivative actions.
Furthermore, Section 7.40(b) provides that before a shareholder could bring an action, he needs to
allege, with particularity, the demand he made to the corporation or why demand was excused.
Section 7.40(b) also provides that if the corporation began to investigate changes in the share-
holder's demand or complaint, the court could choose to delay the proceedings until the investiga-
tion is complete.
Also, as the law in Delaware, Section 7.40 governs dismissal and attorney's fees. Section
7.40(c) of the RMBCA provides that an action would not be dismissed or settled without the
court's approval and that the court will consider the effect of dismissal on the shareholders before
the action is dismissed. In addition, Section 7.40(d) of the RMBCA provides that if the plaintiff
brings an action without probable case and the action is terminated, the plaintiff may be required
to pay the defendant's expenses and attorney's fees. Thus, it is clear that 7.40 provided similar,
and with regard to attorney's fees even more, protection to corporations from derivative actions
than that provided in Delaware.
[Vol. 110
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provided insight. 1 2 Professor Outterson stated, "I asked several members of the
West Virginia Legislature why they failed to enact RMBCA Section 7.40 et seq.
and was told that a powerful group quietly lobbied to keep the new derivative
action rules out. No one would say precisely who requested the change, but
they hinted that it was the West Virginia plaintiffs' bar."
'" 3
Because the West Virginia Legislature failed to enact RMBCA Section
7.40, by default, case law existing prior to the enactment of Section 31-1-102
governs derivative actions in West Virginia. Presently, derivative actions are
governed by Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co.,114 which cites to the
United States Supreme Court case providing a common law right of a derivative
suit from 1855.115 In Felsenheld, a stockholder filed a derivative suit against a
corporation and its officers and directors.11 6 The shareholder alleged that he was
excluded from exercising control of the corporation, that the officers and direc-
tors had misused corporate assets for their own benefit by speculating in the
stock market, and that the directors had awarded themselves excessive salaries,
resulting in a loss to stockholders." 17 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further
proceedings." 8 More significant than the court's holding in Felsenheld, the
court addressed the nature of the derivative suit in West Virginia twice in the
case. First, it cited to a United States Supreme Court case, Dodge v. Woolsey, to
define a derivative action." 9 In doing so, the court defined a derivative suit as
"an equity proceeding by a stockholder in a corporation for the purpose of sus-
taining, in his own name, a right of action existing in the corporation itself, and
in which suit the corporation itself would be an appropriate plaintiff.'
' 20
112 Interview with M. Kevin Outterson, Professor of Law, Boston University (Feb. 28, 2007).
Professor Outerson is a graduate of the University of Cambridge (LL.M.) and Northwestern Uni-
versity (B.S. and J.D.). He teaches courses in health care, business law and globalization.
113 Id.
114 192 S.E. 545 (1937).
115 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1855).
116 Felsenheld, 192 S.E. at 546.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 554. The court held that because there was evidence that the directors used a subsidi-
ary to trade on the stock market in certain securities of a speculative character, the circuit court
should have overruled the demurrer on the claim that the directors and officers had speculated on
the stock market using the corporation's assets. Id. at 548-49. The court also held that the circuit
court committed no error in sustaining a demurrer regarding loans made to officers because all
loans had been repaid to the corporation. Id. at 540-50. Finally, the court held that the circuit
court erred by not overruling the demurrer on the allegations respecting excessive salaries and
gratuities to the officers and directors. Id. at 552.
119 Id. at 546 (citing Dodge, 59 U.S. at 331-41). In Dodge v. Woolsey, the court provided
shareholders with redress against third parties who had damaged or threatened the corporate prop-
erties and whom the corporation through its managers refused to pursue. 59 U.S. at 341.
120 Felsenheld, 192 S.E. at 545-46.
20081
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In addition, the Felsenheld court addressed a shareholder's standing to
bring a derivative action in West Virginia. 121 The court stated that the share-
holders in Felsenheld had standing to bring a derivative action "if, through [the]
wrongful activities of the [defendants], the assets of the [corporation] have been
materially reduced . ,122 The court also addressed the standing of a
beneficiary by mandating that "[t]he doors of equity will not be closed to a
cestui que trust merely because his interest in the corporation, a portion of the
stock whereof constitutes the corpus of the trust, is less direct than that of a legal
stockholder with certificates of stock in his own right. 23  Thus, the leading
substantive authority on derivative actions in West Virginia (1) defines a
derivative action, and (2) briefly addresses standing in a derivative action.
C. Applicability of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1
Though the West Virginia legislature repealed nearly all substantive law
governing derivative actions, the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure still
provide some protection for corporations. 124 West Virginia Rule 23.1, which is
similar to the Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, was adopted by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1998.125 It provides five essential protec-
121 Id. at 547.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 states:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to en-
force a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corpora-
tion or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be as-
serted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plain-
tiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which the
plaintiff complains or that the plaintiffs share or membership thereafter de-
volved on the plaintiff by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a col-
lusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would
not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the ef-
forts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires
from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the share-
holders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the ac-
tion or for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained
if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the in-
terests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right
of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dis-
missal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such
manner as the court directs.
W. Va. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (1998). See also JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACrICE (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the application of Federal Rule 23.1 to substantive
law).
125 W. Va. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (1998).
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tions for corporations against derivative actions. 26 First, it requires that a plain-
tiff bringing the derivative action be a shareholder at the time the alleged
wrongdoing to the corporation.127 Furthermore, Rule 23.1 states that the "action
may not be maintained if ... the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing
the right of the corporation or association."'' 28 Finally, Rule 23.1 provides that
the plaintiff must "allege with particularity" the demand "if any" made to the
board or shareholders and why such a demand was futile or why the demand
was not made.
29
The provisions provided in Rule 23.1 are relevant and important; how-
ever, they are not sufficient for West Virginia to remain competitive with other
business-friendly states for two reasons. First, many attorneys who influence
the decisions of corporate officers may not be aware that the protection exists.
When they search for laws governing derivative actions, they likely search
statutory and case law. Second, even if corporate leaders are aware of Rule
23.1, the protections therein are still substandard to those offered in other states.
Rule 23.1 does not require that demand be made on a corporation before a
shareholder brings a derivative action nor does it allow a corporation to dismiss
a suit when a majority of independent directors deem the suit frivolous. It also
fails to address the allocation of attorney's fees or expenses. Thus, though Rule
23.1 provides important protections, it is still necessary that substantive law be
adopted in West Virginia.
V. ARGUMENT REGARDING THE ENACTMENT OF RMBCA SUBCHAPTER D
SECTIONS 7.40 THROUGH 7.47 IN WEST VIRGINIA
By examining the evolution Model Business Corporations Act and the
details of Subchapter D, it is clear that adopting the well-reasoned provisions of
Subchapter D, in addition to portions of former West Virginia Code Section 31-
1-103, will aid West Virginia in its campaign to "Open for Business" because it
will provide West Virginia with corporate-friendly law that will entice more




129 The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1991 that Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which is very similar to Rule 23.1 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,
is only a pleading rule and "cannot be understood to abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive
right." Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 91 (1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). It
explained that Rule 23.1 does not provide authority for a federal requirement of a demand, and
only the substantive law being applied can create the demand requirement. Id.
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A. The evolution of the Model Business Corporations Act with respect to
derivative actions
Derivative actions evolved through equitable proceedings in the
nineteenth century. 130 In the twentieth century, it was recognized that, while
derivative actions were necessary to protect shareholders, they were
"susceptible to abuse - the 'strike suit' or 'blackmail by litigation. ' "13 1 In
response to this problem, the first Model Act provision regulating the derivative
action, optional Section 43A of the 1960 Model Act, was promulgated. 32 In the
1980s, the Model Business Corporations Act experienced substantial revision
and is often referred to as the "Revised Model Business Corporations Act
(RMBCA).', 133 During that time, Section 7.40 of the RMBCA governed deriva-
tive actions. 134 However, in 1990, Subchapter D, consisting of Sections 7.40
through 7.47 replaced former Section 7.40.135
B. Subchapter D
Subchapter D is divided into the following seven sections: subchapter
definitions, standing, demand, stay of proceedings, dismissal, discontinuance or
settlement, payment of expenses, and applicability to foreign corporations.
136
Section 7.40 defines "derivative proceedings" and "shareholder.' ' 137 Notably, in
its definition of shareholder, Section 7.40 explicitly states that a shareholder
includes a beneficial owner, which is one aspect of law governing derivative
actions that West Virginia Law actually currently regulates.
138
130 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN., 3d ed. at 7-254 to -255 (Supp. 1997).
131 Id. at 7-255.
132 Id. "[S]ection 43A of the 1960 Model Act ... consisted of three paragraphs: the first re-
quired a plaintiff to be an owner of the shares when the claim arose, the second authorized the
court to impose the defendants' expenses upon the plaintiff on a finding that the action was
brought without reasonable cause, and the third imposed a security-for-expenses requirement for
shareholders who owned less than five percent of the corporation's shares or whose shares had a
market value of less than $25,000. In 1962 the first paragraph was amended to add the require-
ment that shares or voting trust certificates be held 'of record."' In 1969, the requirements were
no longer listed as "optional." Id.
133 Id. The RMBCA is the version the West Virginia Legislature largely adopted in 2002. See
supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
135 MODEL Bus. CORu'. Acr introduction at xxv (2005).
136 Id. at 7-82 to 7-98.
137 Id. at 7-83. "In this subchapter: (1) 'Derivative proceeding' means a civil suit in the right
of a domestic corporation or, to the extent provided in section 7.47, in the right of a foreign corpo-
ration. (2) 'Shareholder' includes a beneficial owner whose shares are held in a voting trust or
held by a nominee on the beneficial owner's behalf." The official comment explains that "[iun the
context of subchapter D, beneficial owner means a person having a direct economic interest in the
shares." Id. at 7-84.
138 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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In addition, Section 7.41 of Subchapter D, like Section 327 of Delaware
General Corporation Law, 139  requires contemporaneous ownership for
standing.140  The official comment to Section 7.41 explains that the
contemporaneous ownership rule was maintained because it was clear, simple,
and easy to apply. 14 1 Section 7.41 also requires that the plaintiff must fairly and
adequately represent the corporation's interests.1
42
One controversial aspect of Section 7.42 of subchapter D, which is not
present in former Section 7.40 or in Delaware law, is a universal demand re-
quirement. 143  Thus, the traditional "demand required/demand excused"
distinction is no longer applicable under Section 7.42.144 According to the
official comment, the universal demand requirement was adopted for the
following two reasons: (1) to give the board of directors the opportunity to take
corrective action to avoid a potential law suit, and (2) to eliminate the time and
expense of litigants and the court in determining if demand is required or
excused. 145 Under Section 7.42, a shareholder may commence an action 90 days
after making demand; however, Section 7.43 stipulates that "[i]f the corporation
commences an inquiry into the allegations made in the demand or complaint, the
court may stay any derivative proceeding for such period as the court deems
appropriate." 1
46
Section 7.44 requires that a derivative suit be dismissed if a majority of
independent directors determine, in good faith and after reasonable inquiry, that
the maintenance of the suit would not be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion. 147 In addition, similar to case law in Delaware, Section 7.45 states that "[a]
139 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
14 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT 7-84 (2005). "A shareholder may not commence or maintain a
derivative proceeding unless the shareholder: (1) was a shareholder of the corporation at the time
of the act or omission complained of or became a share-holder though transfer by operation of law
from one who was a shareholder at that time; and (2) fairly and adequately represents the interests
of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation."
141 Id. at 7-85.
142 Id. at 7-84.
143 Id. at 7-86. "No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a written
demand had been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and (2) 90 days have expired
from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the de-
mand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would
result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period." Id.
144 Id. at xxv-xxvi.
145 Id. at 7-86.
146 id. at 7-89.
147 Id. at 7-89-7-90.
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the
corporation if one of the groups specified in subsection (b) or subsection (e)
has determined in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon
which its conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative pro-
ceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation.
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derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or settled without the court's
approval."
' 148
Section 7.45 maintains that before an action may be discontinued or
settled, all affected shareholders must be notified. 149 Section 7.46 orders that a
corporation pay a plaintiffs reasonable expenses if the proceeding results in
substantial benefit to the corporation. 150 Conversely, under Section 7.46, if the
proceeding was "commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an
improper purpose," the plaintiff will be ordered to by the defendant's reasonable
expenses.1 5' Finally, under Section 7.46 the court may order a party to pay the
opposing party's reasonable expenses and attorney's fees. 52 Recoverable fees
include those incurred due to filings that are not "well grounded in fact, after
reasonable inquiry, or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument" and
expenses resulting from "an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.' ' 53  Lastly,
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (e), the determination in
subsection (a) shall be made by: (1) a majority vote of qualified directors pre-
sent at a meeting of the board of directors if the qualified directors constitute a
quorum; or (2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more
qualified directors appointed by majority vote of qualified directors present at
a meeting of the board of directors, regardless of whether such qualified direc-
tors constitute a quorum.
(c) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination has been
made rejecting a demand by a shareholder, the complaint shall allege with
particularity facts establishing either (1) that a majority of the board of direc-
tors did not consist of qualified directors at the time the determination was
made or (2) that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been met.
(d) If a majority of the board of directors consisted of qualified directors at the
time the determination was made, the plaintiff shall have the burden of prov-
ing that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been met; if not, the cor-
poration shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of subsection
(a) have been met.
(e) Upon motion by the corporation, the court may appoint a panel of one or
more individuals to make a determination whether the maintenance of the de-
rivative proceeding is in the best interest of the corporation. In such case, the
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of subsection
(a) have not been met.
Id.
148 Id. at 7-96.
149 Id. "If the court determines that a proposed discontinuance or settlement will substantially
affect the interests of the corporation's shareholders or a class of shareholders, the court shall
direct that notice be given to the shareholders affected."
150 Id. at 7-97. "On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may: (1) order the cor-
poration to pay the plaintiff's reasonable expenses (including counsel fees) incurred in the pro-
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Section 7.47 explains which portions of Subchapter D will apply to foreign cor-
porations.
1 54
C. Subchapter D provides the most extensive regulation of derivative suits
Because substantive law governing derivative actions in West Virginia
is currently reduced to one common law case and arguably some portions of
cases decided between 1966 and 2002 (the portions that were not invalidated by
the repeal of Section 31-1-103), West Virginia is in need of codified law to gov-
ern derivative suits.155 The West Virginia Legislature is presented with several
options regarding the remedy of this problem.
First, the Legislature could choose to ignore the problems created by the
lack of codified law governing derivative actions in West Virginia. By doing
so, the Legislature would arguably leave corporations in West Virginia open to
suit by any shareholder or beneficiary regardless of their failure to bring demand
on the corporation. According to the United States Supreme Court, this type of
free rein by shareholder-plaintiffs on derivative actions "could, if unconstrained,
undermine the basic principle of corporate governance that the decisions of a
corporation-including the decision to initiate litigation-should be made by
the board of directors or the majority of shareholders."'
' 56
In addition, courts would be left with no guidance regarding the pay-
ment of attorney's fees or what procedures to take in the event of a settlement.
Failure to codify law in this area would leave courts with a wide range of discre-
tion and would leave both parties to face extreme uncertainty. It is this type of
uncertainty that plays a role in deterring businesses from incorporating in West
Virginia because it helps create an anti-business climate. Labor lawyers advise
their corporate clients to either incorporate in the state in which they plan to do
business or in a pro-business state such as Delaware or Nevada.157 Thus, to at-
tract more businesses, West Virginia should enact more business-friendly legis-
lation. It should begin this endeavor by enacting substantive law governing
derivative actions.
Second, the Legislature could choose to enact the one substantial Sec-
tion of the RMBCA, Section 7.40, which it chose not to enact when it adopted
virtually the rest of the RMBCA in 2002.158 Adopting any of the provisions
promulgated in the RMBCA would prove beneficial in attracting business to
West Virginia because such provisions have been carefully drafted to protect the
154 Id. at 7-98. "In any derivative proceeding in the right of a foreign corporation, the matters
covered by this subchapter shall be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the
foreign corporation except for sections 7.43, 7.45, and 7.46."
155 See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
156 Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530 (1984).
157 Labor Law Talk, Where Should I Incorporate?, (2005) http://www.laborlawtalk.com/show-
thread.php?t=77164.
158 See supra notes 108 and 110 and accompanying text.
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interests of both shareholders and corporations. All versions of the Model Act
have been drafted and revised by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Sec-
tion of Business Law of the American Bar Association.159 The Committee on
Corporate Laws consists of an appointed chair and twenty-five members who
are partners in law firms, inside general counsels, law and business school pro-
fessors, federal and state judges, and members of the general counsel of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission.' 6° In addition, in the past, a justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court, a former chancellor of Delaware, a chief justice of
Delaware, and a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency have also
served on the committee. 161 Not only is the committee composed of highly in-
telligent and capable people, but it also invites and considers comments from all
interested persons after it publishes proposed changes to the Model Act in The
Business Lawyer. 1
62
With much careful thought, it is not surprising that the Model Act pro-
vides reasoned solutions for preventing corporate misconduct while simultane-
ously protecting the corporation, and thus its shareholders, from frivolous suits
and ill-intentioned plaintiffs. Section 7.40 accomplished this necessary balanc-
ing act by stipulating standing and demand requirements. 163 It also provided
bright-line rules regarding dismissal and attorneys' fees."6
However, with a significant increase in judicial decisions regarding de-
mand requirements in the 1990s, the Committee on Corporate Laws replaced
Section 7.40 with a more comprehensive and detailed Subchapter D. 165 Thus,
while adopting Section 7.40 would be a reasonable alternative to an absence of
codified law, it is still not as straightforward and responsive to recent problems
as is Subchapter D.
Adopting Subchapter D is the third and most comprehensive option for
the West Virginia legislature to provide regulations for balancing the right of
plaintiff shareholders bringing derivative actions and the right of the corporation
to be free from frivolous suits. Not only does Subchapter D provide the same
protections as the former Section 7.0, but it also maintains a universal demand
requirement. 166 In addition, Subchapter D outlines, in more detail, the guide-
lines for filing a derivative action and how important aspects of derivative ac-
tions will be governed.
167




163 See supra notes 11 1-12.
16 Id.
165 See supra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/12
THE DIFFICULTY OF A PLAINTIFF'S PLAYGROUND
D. Arguments for the enactment of Subchapter D
Regulation of derivative actions is necessary to prevent "self-appointed
champions [who] sometimes turn out to be less than noble knights seeking only
to advance the corporate interest."'' 68 In other words, regulations prevent share-
holders from purporting to be protecting companies' interests while actually
risking corporate well-being in furtherance of self-interest. First, standing re-
quirements, as provided in Section 7.41 of Subchapter D, are necessary to pre-
vent the transfer of wealth from the defendant to shareholders who should not
benefit from the recovery. 69 The particular standing requirement in 7.41 is de-
sirable because it is simple, clear, and easy to apply. 170 In addition, by requiring
that the shareholder "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corpora-
tion," Section 7.41 ensures that derivative actions are constrained to their pur-
pose, which is "asserting the corporation's cause of action and seeking recovery
for the corporation."'
' 71
The contemporaneous ownership requirement in 7.41 has been criti-
cized for "being unduly narrow and technical and unnecessary to prevent the
transfer or purchase of lawsuits."'' 72 However, the drafters of the MBCA, Dela-
ware Code Section 327, and West Virginia Code Section 31-1-103 have long
imposed a contemporaneous ownership rule.173 Where no contemporaneous
ownership requirement exists, an opportunistic plaintiff could buy stock at a low
price due to the harm already done to the corporation and receive a windfall
recovery if the suit succeeded. 174 In addition, shareholder plaintiffs who pur-
chase stock for the purpose of filing a derivative suit are likely to file meritless
claims to obtain settlements.
75
Second, Subchapter D Section 7.42 provides a demand requirement,
which is necessary to allow directors to assert necessary claims on behalf of the
corporations and to weed out frivolous claims. 76 The official comment explains
that the universal demand requirement was adopted in Section 7.42 for two rea-
sons. 1
77
168 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORAnON LAW, Hornbook Series, West Group 387 (2000).
169 Id. at 394.
170 See supra note 141.
171 GEVURTZ, supra note 168, at 387.
172 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN., 3rd ed. at 7-85 (1997 Supp.).
173 Id. at 7-84.
174 SOLOMON, LEWIS D. ET. AL., Corporations Law and Policy Materials and Problems, 4th ed.
American Casebook Series, West Group 1037 (1998).
175 GEVURTZ, supra note 168, at 386.
176 See supra notes 143-45.
177 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN., 3rd ed. at 7-86 (1997 Supp.).
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First, even though no director may be independent, the demand
will give the board of directors the opportunity to re-examine
the act complained of in the light of a potential lawsuit and take
corrective action. Secondly, the provision eliminates the time
and expense of the litigants and the court involved in litigating
the question whether demand is required. 78
Critics of the universal demand requirement claim that Section 7.42 pro-
vides that there can be no functional review of a demand refused determination
made by independent directors. 79 However, under the universal demand re-
quirement, a suit can proceed, even if the board rejects the demand, if a plaintiff
can show that the "corporation would suffer irreparable injury as a result."18
Moreover, the Committee determined that "the cases in which demand is ex-
cused are relatively rare."
181
Universal demand is desirable because it allows a corporation to take
corrective action without involving a costly law suit.182 The traditional demand
standard, which allows for the plaintiff to waive demand if the demand would
be futile, often results in unnecessary litigation over the claim. 183 In addition, it
also results in unnecessary litigation over the futility of the demand.184 It is dif-
ficult to ascertain if a demand on a board would be futile, and such litigation can
be expensive. 185
Finally, Section 7.46 of Subchapter D addresses another critical compo-
nent of derivative actions-who pays expenses and attorney's fees. 186 Subchap-
ter D provides an ideal balance of allowing plaintiffs to require when a deriva-
tive action proves beneficial to the corporation.' 87 However, it also protects
corporations from frivolous actions by requiring plaintiffs to pay reasonable
attorneys fees and expenses if the court finds that "the proceeding was com-
menced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose.'
188
Though Subchapter D appears to address the important issues involving
derivative actions, it fails to provide one protection supplied in former West
178 Id.
179 Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act: Death
Knells for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REv. 258 (1993).
180 Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 196 (1996).
181 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., 3rd ed. at 7-86 (1997 Supp.).
182 GEvuRTz, supra note 168, at 408.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 410.
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Virginia Code Section 31--103.181 Section 31-1-103 permitted the corporate
defendant to require that plaintiffs, holding less than five percent of shares, not
exceeding a value of $25,000, give security for the reasonable expenses, should
the plaintiff become legally liable for initiating a frivolous suit.' 90 This provi-
sion of the former West Virginia code is rational; if a wrong has been commit-
ted against a corporation, the shareholders with greater interests should initiate a
derivative action. In addition, this provision provides further security for corpo-
rations from frivolous lawsuits and opportunistic plaintiffs (or plaintiffs' attor-
neys seeking attorneys' fees resulting from a derivative action).
E. The Enactment of Subchapter D and portions offormer West Virginia
Code Section 31-1-103 to aide West Virginia's campaign to "Open for
Business "
While sound policy reasons support the adoption of Subchapter D and
the security provision provided in Section 31-1-103 in every state, West Vir-
ginia has a particular need for such regulation. In West Virginia's struggle to
attract more businesses and thus improve a struggling economy, all reasonable
efforts must be taken to entice businesses to incorporate in West Virginia.
Governor Manchin's desire to promote business in West Virginia is
likely an effort to increase the tax base in West Virginia and thus combat the
deficit in the state treasury that began in the 1980s.191 The budget deficit has
caused a ripple effect and deprives state programs, such as higher education,
from battling state funding cuts.' 92 In addition, the lack of a sufficient budget, if
not remedied, will make the payment of state employee benefits difficult in the
near future.1
93
To improve state funds without raising personal taxes, the executive
branch has launched a campaign to entice business activity in the state. How-
ever, to achieve this goal, the legislative branch must cooperate not only by
making the necessary tax cuts to entice businesses to incorporate within the
state, but also by making the necessary changes to "The Business Corporations
Act." By doing so, the legislature will make West Virginia competitive with
other states, which provide attractive jurisdictions for incorporation.
In particular, West Virginia should adopt Subchapter D and portions of
West Virginia Code Section 31-1-103 for two reasons. First, West Virginia
should make this addition because it presently is at a disadvantage compared to
other states because it essentially provides no codified protection to corporations
189 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
190 Id.
191 Small meeting with Robert S. Kiss, former Speaker of the West Virginia House of Repre-
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from frivolous derivative actions. Second, by adopting Subchapter D and a pro-
vision requiring a security deposit from shareholders having very little interest
in the corporation, the West Virginia Legislature will create a favorable scheme
that is attractive to businesses.
IV. CONCLUSION
More action must be taken by the Legislature to attract corporations to
West Virginia, which, in turn, would increase the tax base while creating jobs.
Though the Legislature and Governor Manchin have been diligent in the cam-
paign to "open West Virginia for business," an oversight in the law governing
derivative actions may prevent some corporations from choosing West Virginia
as a state in which to incorporate. Corporate leaders may perceive a lack of
codified protection from frivolous derivative actions as an invitation for plain-
tiffs' attorneys to sue corporations incorporated in West Virginia. Therefore,
they may decide to incorporate in other states, such as Delaware.
To prevent this, and in effort to make West Virginia a more business-
friendly state, the West Virginia Legislature should adopt Subchapter D and a
security provision. Subchapter D and a security provision would arguably give
West Virginia the most comprehensive statutory regulation governing derivative
actions in the nation and would be a step toward West Virginia becoming truly
"open for business."
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